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NOTE 
STICKS AND STONES MAY BREAK YOUR 
BONES . .. BUT WORDS MAY BREAK THE 
BANK: MONETARY DAMAGES FOR 
'TRUE THREATS' AND THE 
FUTURE OF FREE SPEECH AFTER 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF THE 
COLUMBIAIWILLAMETTE V. 
AMERICAN COALITION OF LIFE 
ACTIVISTS 
INTRODUCTION 
The only difference between the expression of an opinion and 
an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's 
enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason. 
-Oliver Wendell Holmes-1 
In May of 2002, an en bane panel of the Ninth Circuit held 
that the use of "Wanted" style posters to list personal 
information about abortion providers by anti-choice groups was 
not protected by the First Amendment.2 Prior to this case, 
three abortion providers, all of whom had been subjects of 
similar wanted-style posters, were murdered.3 Seen in the 
context of these murders, the majority reasoned that the 
I Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
2 Planned Parenthood of the ColumbiaIWillamette, Inc., v. American Coalition of 
Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). 
3 The murdered doctors were Dr. David Gunn, Dr. George Patterson and Dr. John 
Britton. See Background Section infra notes 12 to 24. 
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posters had "acquired currency" as a harbinger for the 
impending death of the poster's subject.4 When viewed through 
this lens, the majority held that the posters amounted to 'true 
threats' that landed outside the usually wide purview of the 
First Amendment. 
In finding the defendants civilly liable for threatening 
speech, the court upheld a permanent injunction prohibiting 
the use of the poster format. Although an enormous punitive 
damages award of over $108 million was vacated and 
remanded to determine if it comported with due process, the 
court nevertheless stayed a general damages award of over 
$525,000.5 This Note contends that the use of wanted-style 
posters, while of questionable taste, is nothing more than a 
form of political activism that is generally protected by the 
First Amendment.6 Furthermore, this Note argues that 
excessive monetary judgments for speech made on issues of 
social and political import improperly narrows freedom of 
speech. 
In support of these contentions, this Note is divided into 
five parts. Part I introduces the plaintiffs and defendants in 
Planned Parenthood and provides a detailed description of the 
content of the posters as well as the other evidence used to find 
the defendants liable for threatening speech.7 Part II presents 
a brief description of the details of, and impetus for, the 
enactment of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act 
("FACE"), as the act provides the basis for liability.s To 
4 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/ Willamette, 290 F.3d at 1079. 
5 Id. at 1066, 1088. The Plaintiffs' sued under both the Freedom of Access to 
Clinics Entrances Act (FACE), 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(I), as well as under the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962. While the a 
discussion of the RICO claims is outside the scope of this Note, it is important here to 
observe that when the compensatory and punitive damage award of the FACE claims 
are added to the RICO damage awards, the total damages awarded were 
$120,868,893.00. See also id. at 1062, 1066n.4. 
6 See e.g., United States v. Watts, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969) (given our "profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust and wide open, and may well include vehement, caustic and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."). Id. (citing 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 383 U.S. 254, 270 (1966»; see also N~tional 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 
898 926-927 (1982) (where liability is based on "a public address--which predominantly 
contained highly charged political rhetoric lying at the core of the First Amendment-
we approach the suggested basis for liability with extreme care."). Id. 
7 See infra notes 12 to 63 and accompanying text. 
S See infra notes 64 to 71 and accompanying text. The plaintiffs also alleged that 
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highlight that the majority's position in Planned Parenthood 
did not comport with current First Amendment jurisprudence, 
Part III analyzes the major decisions handed down in this area 
in the past four decades.9 Part IV offers a synthesis of the facts 
of the instant case with the precedent set forth in the cases 
discussed in Part III. Part IV argues that under the Supreme 
Court's 'true threat' precedent, as well as the Ninth Circuit's 
own standard for defining a 'threat,' the posters and supporting 
evidence must be viewed as the type of political speech that has 
long been protected by the First Amendment.1o Finally, Part V 
looks at other cases where liability was premised on a violation 
of FACE and suggests that even if liability was proper in the 
instant case, the remedy was not.11 Injunctive relief is the 
least restrictive with respects to prohibiting political speech 
and should be the preferred remedy if political speech steps 
outside the protections provided by the First Amendment. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. CONTEXTUAL BACKDROP 
On March 10, 1993, Dr. David Gunn was shot and killed as 
he entered the Pensacola, Florida clinic where he performed 
abortions. Prior to his murder, Dr. Gunn's name, address, 
photograph and other personal information were the subject of 
two different wanted-style posters. The first ''Wanted'' poster 
stated in large, bold font that Dr. Gunn was an "abortionist."12 
The poster instructed the reader to attempt to persuade Dr. 
Gunn to leave his profession by writing personal letters as well 
as praying and fasting. 13 The second poster, entitled 
"Unwanted," was more straightforward and deliberate. It 
stated that Dr. Gunn killed children at designated locations, 
the defendants violated both state and federal RICO statutes. See Planned Parenthood 
of the ColumbiaIWillamette v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 945 F.Supp. 1355 
(D. Or. 1996). As previously noted, the RICO charges are outside the scope of this Note. 
However, the portion of the overall damages award that was based on RICO statutes 
will be discussed briefly in Part V infra notes 215 to 242. 
9 See infra notes 72 to 137 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 138 to 214 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 215 to 247 and accompanying text. 
12 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/ Willamette, Inc., 290 F.3d at 1063-1064. 
13 Id. at 1064. 
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and that he should be considered "heavily armed and very 
dangerous" to "defenseless unborn babies."14 
Around the time of Dr. Gunn's murder, a similar wanted-
style poster circulated depicting the name, address and 
physical description of Dr. George Patterson, an abortion 
provider who operated a clinic in Mobile, Alabama. On August 
21, 1993, less than six months after the murder of Dr. Gunn, 
Dr. Patterson was shot and killed in front of his Mobile clinic. 
Dr. John Baynard Britton replaced Dr. Gunn and 
continued to provide abortions at the Pensacola clinic. On July 
29, 1994, Paul Hill, an anti-choice activist shot and killed Dr. 
Britton as he entered another abortion clinic in the Pensacola 
area. James Barrett, Dr. Britton's volunteer escort was also 
killed in the attack. Hill wounded James Barrett's wife, who 
was present at the scene and witnessed her husband's murder. 
As with Dr. Gunn, Dr. Britton was the subject of an 
"Unwanted" poster. The poster listed his home and office 
addresses and phone numbers, as well as his photograph and 
physical description. 15 It further stated that Dr. Britton was 
wanted for "crimes against humanity" and that he should be 
considered "armed and extremely dangerous to women and 
children."16 
The purpose of this Note is not to enter the abortion fray 
and discuss whether Michael Griffin or Paul Hill, both of whom 
were ultimately convicted of the murders of doctors Gunn and 
Britton, should have been allowed to present a defense of 
justifiable homicide at trial.l7 Nor is the purpose to explore the 
connection, if any, between the posters and the murders of 
doctors Gunn, Patterson and Britton. Rather, the sole purpose 
of this Note is to analyze whether the use of subsequent 
posters-which depicted different doctors but contained 
essentially the same type of personal information-should be 
considered political speech protected by the First Amendment, 
or a 'true threat.' 
14 Id. 
15 Planned Parenthood of the ColumbialWillamette, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1135 
(D. Or. 1999). 
16 Planned Parenthood of the ColumbialWillamette, Inc., 290 F.3d at 1063. 
17 Burnett, Crane, Dodds, Foreman, McMillan, Ramey and Stover, all defendants in 
the instant case, prepared a statement following Gunn's murder that supported 
Griffin's acquittal based on a theory of justifiable homicide. See id. at 1064. 
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Recently, in Planned Parenthood of the 
ColumbialWillamette Inc., v. American Coalition of Life 
Advocates, (hereinafter, Planned Parenthood) the Ninth Circuit 
narrowly decided en banc that the use of such posters, as well 
as a website that contained similar personal information about 
abortion providers and their supporters, was not protected 
speech.18 The court held that the use of these mediums to 
convey personal information about abortion providers 
constituted threatening speech in violation of FACE,19 FACE 
imposes criminal and civil liability on anyone who by "force or 
threat of force" interfere with those engaged in providing 
reproductive health services.20 In Planned Parenthood, FACE 
exposed the defendants to civil penalties in the form of an 
enormous monetary award as well as a permanent injunction.21 
The subject of abortion, while certainly a moral and 
philosophical issue to some, is undoubtedly a highly politicized 
issue to most Americans. Speech on highly charged political 
issues has traditionally been given a wide berth with respect to 
18 Id. at 1088-1089. As of the current date, five decisions have been published 
regarding this case, three in the District of Oregon, and two handed down from the 
Ninth Circuit. The first was the district court's denial of the defendants Motion to 
Dismiss in Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition 
of Life Activists, 945 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Or. 1996) [hereinafter Planned Parenthood 1]. 
The second published opinion was the court's denial of the defendants Motion for 
Summary Judgment in Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc., v. 
American Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or. 1998) [hereinafter 
Planned Parenthood II). Next came the district court's issuance of a permanent 
injunction against the defendants in Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, 
Inc., v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Or. 1999) 
[hereinafter Planned Parenthood 111]. Fourth, finding that the district court erred in 
allowing the jury verdict to stand because it commingled the non-violent actions of the 
defendants with the violent actions of the third parties, a three-judge panel of the 
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded in Planned Parenthood of the 
Columbia/Willamette, Inc., v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 244, F.3d 1007 (9th 
Cir. 2001) [hereinafter, Planned Parenthood IVJ. Fifth, citing that the issues in the case 
were "obviously important," the Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banco There, holding 
that "ALCA's conduct amounted to a true threat and is not protected speech," a six to 
five majority reversed the panel's earlier decision and reinstated the trial courts 
findings as to injunctive relief and civil damages, but vacated the punitive damages 
award and remanded the for consideration of whether the award comported with due 
process. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc., V. American Coalition 
of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter, Planned Parenthood V). 
19 See 18 U.S.C. § 248(a). 
20 Id. 
21 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1066. In addition to the permanent 
injunction the compensatory and punitive damage award of the FACE claims, when 
added to the RICO damage award, totaled $120,868,893.00. See id. See also, note 5 
supra. 
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First Amendment protection.22 Speech that incorporates the 
use of personal information about a political adversary and 
then disseminates that information via posters or the internet 
in an effort to either persuade like-minded individuals to 
action, or to dissuade the adversary, is at the core of our notion 
of free speech. While this form of activism is of questionable 
taste and is no doubt distressing to those in the opposing camp, 
neither the fear it engenders nor the tastelessness of the 
method takes the speech outside of the purviews of the First 
Amendment.23 In short, unless such activism amounts to a 
'true threat' it is protected and guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.24 This Note argues that the majority in Planned 
Parenthood failed to properly interpret and apply over four 
decades of precedent that defined what constitutes a 'true 
threat.' Furthermore, in allowing the injunction to stand and 
endorsing the crushing monetary damage award, the court 
silenced previously protected speech and improperly narrowed 
the constitutional protections of the First Amendment. 
B. THE CASE 
In October 1995, four abortion providers Dr. Robert Crist, 
Dr. James Newhall, his wife, Dr. Elizabeth Newhall and Dr. 
Warren M. Hern, along with two clinics that provided abortion 
services, including Planned Parenthood of the 
ColumbialWillamette, filed a lawsuit in the federal district 
court for the district of Oregon seeking injunctive relief and 
over 200 million dollars in damages.25 The suit named as 
defendants several individual activists, all of whom were 
directors of either the American Coalition of Life Advocates 
("ACLA") or the American Life Ministries ("ALM"), as well as 
the organizations themselves. The ACLA was a newly-formed 
22 See e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). The First 
Amendment was "fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing 
about of political and social changes desired by the people." Id. 
23 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
24 True threats are proscribable under the holding of Watts. See Watts, 394 U.S. at 
707. The Supreme Court has also recognized other types of speech that fall outside the 
First Amendment including 'incitement,' Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 
(1969); and 'fighting words,' Chapiinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-573 
(1942). 
25 See Planned Parenthood I, 945 F. Supp. at 1355. 
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anti-choice group that advocated the use of violence to bring an 
end to the institution of legalized abortion in the United 
States.26 The founding members of the ALCA had at one time 
been members of Operation Rescue, the foremost anti-choice 
organization in the United States.27 The founders of ACLA 
split from Operation Rescue when the latter publicly 
condemned murders of doctors Gunn, Patterson and Britton 
and the use of violence against abortion providers in general. 28 
The ACLA's commitment to the use of violence to end abortion 
is evidenced by the statement of one of the founders who noted 
that if someone were to condemn the use of violence against 
abortion "they probably wouldn't have felt comfortable working 
with US."29 
The plaintiffs alleged that they had been the targets of 
threats by the ACLA and the ALM, as well as the individual 
named defendants. The plaintiffs brought their suit under the 
recently enacted FACE statute, which imposes both civil and 
criminal liability on any person who uses "force or threat of 
force ... [to] ... intimidate ... or attempt to intimidate ... 
any person ... providing reproductive health services. "30 The 
defendants argued that the "Wanted" style posters and 
website31 were neither threatening, nor intimidating and filed 
a motion to dismiss followed by a motion for summary 
judgment.32 Both motions were denied and the case went to 
trial in January of 1998. 
After a month long trial, the jury deliberated for four days 
and found for the plaintiffs. The jury ordered the defendants to 
pay the plaintiffs over $525,000 in general compensatory 
damages and over $108 million in punitive damages.33 In 
addition to this large monetary damage verdict, the trial court 
later held that allowing the defendants to maintain the website 
and continue to use both the "Wanted" and "Unwanted" style 
26 See Planned Parenthood III, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1136. 
27 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1064. 
28 Id. 
29 See Planned Parenthood III, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1136. 
30 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(l). 
31 Allegations based on the "Nuremberg Files" web site were amended to the 
complaint after the case was originally filed. 
32 See Planned Parenthood I, 945 F. Supp. at 1355 (Motion to Dismiss), and 
Planned Parenthood 11,23 F. Supp. 2d at 1182 (Motion for Summary Judgment). 
33 See Planned Parenthood Vat 1066n.4; see also Part V infra notes 215 to 218. The 
jury also awarded over 12 million dollars on.both Federal and Oregon RICO claims. Id. 
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posters would place the plaintiffs in a constant fear of death 
and bodily harm.34 In response to this finding, the trial court 
issued a permanent injunction that enjoined and restrained the 
defendants from republishing or reproducing the posters and 
from further distributing any information contained in the 
"Nuremberg Files" website.35 . 
The ACLA and the individual defendants timely appealed 
the decision, claiming that the First Amendment protected 
their actions.36 Mter reviewing the record de novo, the panel 
stated that neither the posters nor the website mention 
violence or expressly threaten anyone. Moreover, the court 
found that the statements were made in the context of public 
discourse on a highly politicized issue. Although the panel 
noted that words alone are not dispositive in assessing whether 
the statements constituted a 'true threat,' they found that only 
so much could be inferred from the context of the speech.37 The 
court conceded that the publishing of the plaintiffs' personal 
information might make it easier for persons to carry out 
violent attacks against them, but held that political speech may 
not be punished if its only sin is that it may make it more likely 
that "someone will be harmed at some unknown time by an 
unrelated third party."38 Given that the defendants' 
statements were made publicly and did not expressly threaten 
the plaintiffs, the court vacated the damages verdict and 
remanded with instructions to dissolve the injunction.39 
Citing that the issues in the case were "obviously 
important," the Ninth Circuit granted the plaintiffs' petition to 
rehear the case en bane. 40 The plaintiffs argued that the trial 
court correctly allowed the jury to use the murders of doctors 
34 See Planned Parenthood III, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1155-1156. 
35 See id. 
36 See Planned Parenthood IV; 244 F.3d at 1013. 
37 See United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2000). There, the 
defendant parked a Ryder Truck in front of an abortion clinic. The court held that in 
light of the use of a Ryder truck in the Oklahoma City bombing-the defendant knew or 
should have known that clinicians would fear for their lives. Thus the use of the truck, 
and not any words spoken by the defendant, was considered a 'true threat.' Note, 
however that liability was also premised on the fact that the defendant told his father 
that he intended to threaten the clinicians in order to save the lives of unborn babies. 
See id. See also Part IV infra, notes 196 to 203. 
38 See, Planned Parenthood IV; 244 F.3d at 1015. 
39 Id. at 1019-1020. 
40 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1062. 
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Gunn, Patterson and Britton as a contextual backdrop to find 
that the posters and website constituted 'true threats' within 
the meaning of FACE. The plaintiffs contended that the case 
was properly delivered to the jury and that the verdict as well 
as the injunction ordered by the district judge should be 
reinstated.41 In contrast, the ACLA argued that the district 
court decision should be reversed because "liability was based 
on speech that constituted neither an incitement to imminent 
lawless action nor a 'true threat,' and as such was merely 
political speech."42 The defendants further contended that 
their otherwise, protected political speech could not be 
mitigated into the realm of unprotected speech simply because 
there was a context of violence created by the actions of third 
parties.43 
In a narrow 6 to 5 decision the panel agreed with the 
plaintiffs' contentions, finding first, that the district court 
properly applied existing 'true threat' jurisprudence to the jury 
instructions, and second, that the ALCA was aware that the 
wanted-style posters and the information contained on the 
website would be interpreted by reproductive services 
providers as "serious threats of death or bodily harm" in 
violation of FACE.44 The panel was "independently satisfied 
that to this limited extent, the ACLA's conduct amounted to a 
true threat and [was] not protected speech."45 The en bane 
panel thus affirmed the district court findings as to the general 
damages and equitable relief.46 . 
C. THE THREATS 
At trial, and ultimately on appeal, three specific "threats" 
were at issue. The first was a wanted-style poster entitled "The 
Deadly Dozen," which was either created or endorsed by each 
defendant. The poster contained the names and home 
addresses of thirteen separate abortion providers. The second 
41 See id. at 1071. 
42 Id. at 1071·1072. 
43 Id. at 1071. 
44 Id. at 1067. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 1086. Note that the panel vacated the punitive damages portion of the 
jury verdict and remanded to see whether the award comported with due process. See 
id. 
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threat was a wanted-style poster (the Crist Poster) portraying 
Dr. Robert Crist, one of the four physicians who initially filed 
suit against the defendants. The final threat was the 
"Nuremberg Files," a website that contained personal 
information about over four hundred abortion providers and 
their supporters that the defendants contributed to and 
operated. As the information contained in these two types of 
mediums constituted the bulk of the evidence used to find the 
defendants liable for threatening and intimidating the 
plaintiffs, the content of each will be described thoroughly. 
1. The "Deadly Dozen" Poster 
In January 1995, defendant ACLA created and printed the 
"Deadly Dozen" poster. At the top, the poster reads "GUILTY" 
and underneath, in smaller print, "OF CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANITY." The poster explains that during WWII the 
Nazi's allowed abortion for Jewish women and the Allies 
prosecuted those Nazis as war criminals under "Allied Control 
Order No. 10" during the Nuremberg trials of 1945-1946.47 
Underneath this information lays the heading "THE DEADLY 
DOZEN." Under this heading the poster lists the names and 
the home addresses of thirteen physicians who provide 
abortions. Of the thirteen physicians on the list, three, Dr. 
James Newhall, Dr. Elizabeth Newhall and Dr. Warren Hern 
were plaintiffs in the instant case. The poster offers a "$5,000 
REWARD" "for information leading to the arrest, conviction 
and revocation of license to practice medicine. "48 At the bottom 
of the poster, in large print, reads the word "ABORTIONIST." 
Following the ACLA's release of the poster during a rally in 
Washington, D.C., the FBI contacted each of the physicians 
named on the poster and offered the services of the U.S. 
Marshals to provide twenty-four hour personal security for the 
physicians and their families. 49 Upon hearing that the poster 
had garnered such a response by both the physicians and the 
authorities, defendant ALM republished the poster in its own 
Life Advocate magazine. 50 
47 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1064. 
48 Id. 
49 See Planned Parenthood III, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1132. 
50 Id. 
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2. The Crist Poster 
In August of 1995, eight months after the release of the 
"Deadly Dozen" poster, the ACLA released a similar poster 
focusing on Dr. Robert Crist. The ACLA released the "Crist 
Poster" during a rally on the steps of the old federal courthouse 
in St. Louis, which not coincidentally, was the same federal 
courthouse where the infamous Dred Scott case was decided.51 
Each of the named defendants either assisted in the creation of 
the poster, or ratified its release. 52 As with the Deadly Dozen 
poster, the top of the Crist Poster reads, in large print, 
"GUILTY," and below, in smaller print, "OF CRIMES 
AGAINST HUMANITY." Mter divulging Dr. Crist's personal 
information, including his home and business addresses, the 
poster implores the reader to "write, leaflet or picket his 
neighborhood to expose his bloodguilt." In still smaller print, 
the poster offers a "$500 REWARD" "to any ACLA organization 
that successfully persuades Crist to turn from his child killing 
through activities within ACLA guidelines. "53 Again, as with 
the "Deadly Dozen" poster, the word "ABORTIONIST" appears 
in large, bold font at the bottom of the poster. Immediately 
following the release of the Crist Poster, the St. Louis police 
contacted Dr. Crist and suggested that he take additional 
security precautions in light of the poster.54 
3. The Nuremberg Files Website 
In 1996, at a rally in Washington, D.C., commemorating 
the valor of those incarcerated for anti-abortion violence, the 
ACLA unveiled the "Nuremberg Files" website. The website's 
stated purpose was collecting dossiers on abortionists in 
anticipation ,of one day prosecuting them for crimes against 
humanity. 55 The founders wanted to use the information to 
61 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). See also Planned Parentlwod V, 
290 F.3d at 1065 (there, the defendants were trying to draw a correlation between the 
Dred Scott Court's holding that blacks were considered property under the 
constitution, and that in the eyes of the defendant's, so too were unborn babies under 
our current law). Id. 
62 See Planned Parenthood III, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1133. 
63 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1065. 
64 See Planned Parenthood III, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1133. 
65 See Leigh Noffsinger, Comment, Wanted Posters, Bulletproof Vests, and the First 
Amendment: Distinguishing True Threats from Coercive Political Advocacy, 74 WASH. 
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ensure that "once the tide of this Nation's opinion turns against 
the wanton slaughter of God's children" and abortion becomes a 
crime, abortion providers would have a different fate than 
many Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg, who were set free due 
to a lack of evidence. 56 Under the heading of "ABORTIONIST," 
the website listed the names of over two hundred abortion 
providers, as well as the names of another two hundred 
"accomplices," most of whom were politicians, judges, police 
officers and other abortion rights supporters.57 The names of 
the four physician plaintiffs all appeared under the heading of 
"ABORTIONISTS." Employees and directors of the two health 
clinic plaintiffs also appeared in the Files.58 In addition to the 
lists of providers and supporters, the site contained a legend, 
which stated that the names that appeared in black font were 
"Still Working," those that were greyed-out were "Wounded," 
and those with a red strikethrough were "Fatalities." The 
names of doctors Gunn, Patterson and Britton all had a 
strikethrough. 59 
None of the "threats" at issue contain any expressly 
threatening language. The posters offer "Rewards" for any 
member of the ACLA who is successful in persuading (via 
lawful means such as picketing, fasting or praying) any doctor 
to desist from providing abortions. The posters do not offer 
rewards to anyone who kills a doctor. Nor do they contain any 
express language that could be construed as suggesting that 
others commit violence against the doctors, such as wanted 
"dead or alive." Similarly, the website contains no explicit 
threat. And while it does contain the personal information of 
those listed, there is nothing to suggest that the creators 
themselves intended that the information be used to help 
commit violence against the doctors. 
Lack of an express threat is not dispositive. The courts 
have held that threats can be implied from the context in which 
L. REV. 1209, 1213 (1999). 
66 See Nuremberg Files website at httpll.www.christiangallery.com/atrocity. 
67 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1065. 
68 See Planned Parenthood III, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1133. 
69 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1065. See also Leigh Noffsinger, 
Comment, Wanted Posters, Bulletproof Vests, and the First Amendment: 
Distinguishing True Threats from Coercive Political Advocacy, 74 WASH. L. REV. 
1209, 1213 (1999). 
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they were delivered.60 This is true, even in instances where no 
words were spoken between the deliverer of the threat and his 
intended target.61 The lack of any express threat in Planned 
Parenthood means that the court had to infer the "threats" 
entirely from the context in which they were delivered. That 
"context" was the murders of the other doctors by third parties 
who had no relation to the defendants in the instant case.62 
Where the court or a jury must infer a threat entirely from 
context, there is a distinct possibility that the sins of the 
unassociated violent actors will be visited upon the non-violent 
defendants on trial for allegedly threatening behavior.63 
When courts impose liability where there is no express threat 
and no evidence that the defendants intended to convey a 
threat, political activists who take unpopular political positions 
may suffer, and the umbrella of the First Amendment becomes 
less effective. 
II. THE FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO CLINICS ENTRANCES ACT 
AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS. 
Congress enacted FACE in May of 1994.64 The Act was 
signed into law during the air of violence that encapsulated the 
murders of doctors Gunn and Patterson and was primarily 
enacted to counter the growing number of methods employed 
by anti-choice activists to deny women access to clinics that 
provide reproductive services.65 The Senate noted that in the 
60 See e.g., Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (1969). 
61 See Hart, 212 F.3d at 1069·1070 (8th Cir. 2000) (there, the defendant parked a 
Ryder Truck in front of an abortion clinic. The court held that in light of the use of a 
Ryder truck in the Oklahoma City bombing-the defendant knew or should have known 
that clinicians would fear for their lives. Thus, it was the use of the truck was the 'true 
threat' and not any words spoken by the defendant). Id. 
62 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1090 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). There was 
no evidence that the defendants in the instant case ever engaged in violent acts against 
abortion providers. [d. 
63 See Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J. L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 283, 346 (2001). "Some of the most difficult cases to analyze are those 
where the alleged threat is not explicit ... the courts reliance on subjective factors often 
results in decisions that restrict speech that ought to be protected by the First 
Amendment." [d. Furthermore, without a showing of intent, "there is a danger that 
ambiguous statements, not intended as threats will be interpreted as threats under the 
reasonable speakerllistener test." Id. at 316. 
64 See 18 U.S.C. § 248. 
66 See H.R. Rep. 103-306 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 699 (1994). 
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previous fifteen years, documented instances of violence, 
including bombings, arson and physical blocking of clinic 
entrances numbered in the several thousands.66 In an effort to 
curb the trend of violence and intimidation tactics used against 
both the women who sought abortions and the doctors who 
provided them, the Act allows for the imposition of civil and 
criminal liability on any person who uses "force or threat of 
force" to intimidate or attempt to intimidate people from 
obtaining or providing reproductive health services. 67 FACE 
does not define what is meant by the term "threat," but the 
creators admonished that the Act should not be construed to 
"prohibit any expressive conduct protected from legal 
prohibition by the First Amendment."68 Therefore, liability for 
using "force or threat of force" requires that the court define 
what constitutes a threat in a way that is consistent with the 
First Amendment.69 
FACE provides a cause of action to any person prevented 
from either obtaining or providing reproductive services by the 
conduct proscribed by the statute.70 In terms of the civil 
remedies available to the aggrieved, the Act gives discretion to 
the court and allows for any appropriate relief, including 
temporary and permanent injunctions as well as compensatory 
and punitive damages. 71 
III. WATTS, BRANDENBBURG AND CLAIBORNE HARDWARE: 
ARTICULATING THE 'TRUE THREAT' STANDARD 
The core issue in Planned Parenthood is the point at which 
impassioned, inflaming and even caustic political speech 
crosses the line and loses the protections of the First 
Amendment. In some areas, the courts have drawn a bright 
line between protected and unprotected speech. Thus, we know 
that speech that tends to incite immediate lawless action is 
unprotected,72 as is speech that, when taken in context, is 
66 See Id. (documenting specific instances of violence and intimidation including 
bombings, instances of arson and acid attacks). 
67 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(I). 
68 Id. § 248(d)(I). 
69 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1071. 
70 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(1)(A). 
71 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(1)(B). 
72 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448. 
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likely to provoke immediate violence, usually characterized as 
"fighting words."73 Similarly, speech that, again, when taken 
in context constitutes a 'true threat' also falls outside the 
protections of the First Amendment.74 But at what point does 
speech become truly threatening to the listener? In the area of 
'true threat' jurisprudence, the line drawn by the Court is 
much less distinct. One reason for the haziness is that both 
Supreme Court decisions, as well as those of lower courts, often 
commingle, though not necessarily wrongly, the prohibition of 
speech and conduct using both incitement and 'true threat' 
theories.75 
While the issue has been narrowed in the years since the 
Supreme Court first announced a standard in Watts v. United 
States, several important questions still remain unanswered. 
The most important of which is at what point does the context 
in which the threat was made take on more importance than 
the speaker's intent to actually threaten the listener? This 
question becomes especially important if, as in Planned 
Parenthood, there was no explicit threat and there was no 
evidence that the defendants intended to threaten or physically 
harm the plaintiffs. 
Much of the 'true threat' precedent came out the somewhat 
tumultuous eras that included both the civil rights and anti-
war movements. Watts v. United States involved an explicit 
threat to kill then President Lyndon Johnson.76 In August 
1966, Watts attended a public rally at the Washington 
Monument to protest the war in Vietnam.77 Mter the rally, 
attendees divided into smaller discussion groups.78 Watts was 
part of a group discussing the subject of police brutality. At one 
point, Watts-who was 18 at the time and had just received his 
draft notice-was overheard by an Army Counter Intelligence 
Agent as stating, "I'm not going [to Vietnam]. If they ever 
make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is 
L.B.J."79 Watts was convicted under a 1917 statute that 
73 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572-573. 
74 See Watts, 394 U.S. at 706. 'What is a threat must be distinguished from what is 
constitutionally protected speech." [d. 
75 See e.g., Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 898 (1982). 
76 Watts, 394 U.S. at 705-706. 
77 [d. at 705. 
78 [d. at 706. 
79 [d. 
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prohibited any person from knowingly and willfully making a 
threat to take the life of the President of the United States.80 
lllustrating the importance of intent in 'true threat' 
jurisprudence, both of the lower courts grappled with the 
meaning of the statute's "knowingly and willfully" requirement. 
In upholding Watts' conviction, The United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia found that the 
requirement is met if the words were spoken "with an apparent 
determination to carry them out."81 
In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court noted that 
regardless of the statute's intent requirement, the government 
was first required to prove that the speech constituted a true 
threat.82 The Court found that the type of political hyperbole 
Watts engaged in, taken in context, did not fit within this 
statutory scheme.83 In announcing its decision, the Court 
stated that Congress's selection of the word 'threat' in the 
statute must be set against the backdrop of a "profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open, and may 
well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly 
sharp attacks on government and public officials."84 
Although the decision in Watts falls well short of 
establishing a bright line distinction between protected speech 
and a 'true threat,' the opinion is nonetheless noteworthy in 
three important respects. First, the Court announced that 
taken in context, Watts' speech was not threatening because it 
was clear that he had neither the immediate ability nor the 
inclination to carry out the threat.85 Second, the opinion 
suggests that although some speech may be expressly 
threatening, such speech remains protected by the First 
Amendment unless, taken in context, that speech would 
constitute an immediate threat to the intended target.86 Third, 
connecting Watts' "threat" to kill LBJ with our long tradition of 
protecting and even encouraging "robust and wide-open" 
so Id. 
8l See id. at 707. 
82 Id. at 708. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. (citing New York Times Co., 396 U.S. at 270). 
85 Watts, 394 U.S at 707. 
86 Id. at 708. 
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political debate, the opinion indicates that even expressly 
threatening speech can fall within the purview of the First 
Amendment if the speech is made in a political, as opposed to 
private, context.S7 
Less than six months after its decision in Watts, the 
Supreme Court further distinguished unprotected speech from 
protected political advocacy in Brandenburg v. Ohio.sS In 
Brandenburg, the petitioner was the self-professed leader of a 
Ku Klux Klan group based in Hamilton County, Ohio.s9 The 
petitioner invited a reporter from a Cincinnati news station to 
attend and film one of the Klan's upcoming organizational 
meetings.90 The reporter accepted and he and a cameraman 
attended the meeting. The film showed twelve men dressed in 
full Klan garb.91 While portions of the film were 
incomprehensible, several of the attendees can be heard 
making derogatory remarks about Mrican Americans and 
Jews.92 At one point, the petitioner addressed the gathering 
and stated, "We're not a revengant (sic) organization, but if our 
President, our Congress and our Supreme Court continues to 
suppress the white, Caucasian race, its possible that there 
might have to some revengence (sic) taken."93 
Petitioner was arrested and convicted of violating Ohio's 
now defunct Criminal Syndicalism Act.94 The Act prohibited 
any person from voluntarily assembling and advocating the 
duty, necessity or propriety of violence or unlawful methods of 
terrorism as a means of accomplishing political reform.95 In 
striking down the Ohio Act as a violation of both the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that 
the statute failed to distinguish between mere advocacy from 
"incitement to imminent lawless action."96 The Court noted, 
"the mere abstract teaching ... of the moral propriety or even 
87 Id. (citing New York Times Co., 396 U.S. at 270). 
88 See e.g., Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444·448. 
89 Id. at 445. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 445, 446. 
92 Phrases that were audible included; "[B)ury the niggers, we intend to do our 
part" and "[N)igger will have to fight for every inch he gets from now on." [d. at 444· 
446 (1969). 
93 [d. 
94 Id. at 445. 
95 Id. at 444. 
96 Id. at 448. 
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moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the 
same as preparing a group for violent action."97 Under 
Brandenburg, speech that condones and even advocates the use 
of violence in the abstract is constitutionally protected by the 
First Amendment, so long as the speech, taken in context, is 
not likely to lead to imminent lawless action.98 
Thus, while not expressly referring to Watts, Brandenburg 
expands the standard articulated there. Watts stands for the 
principle that expressly threatening speech must be taken in 
context, and the context must include the speaker's ability to 
immediately harm the intended target.99 The standard 
articulated in Brandenburg, that speech remains protected 
even if it advocates the use of violence, so long as such 
advocacy will not result in "imminent lawless action" is 
consistent with Watts. Even though Brandenburg was decided 
using an incitement theory, what emerges from the two 
decisions is a narrower definition of what constitutes a 'true 
threat.' First, threats made publicly involving political or 
social issues deserve heightened scrutiny by the courts.lOO 
Second, a threat must be taken in context, and the context 
must include the speaker's desire and ability to immediately 
harm the intended target.101 And finally, speech that expressly 
or impliedly advocates the use of violence to effect social or 
political change remains protected by the First Amendment, 
unless that speech, taken in context, is likely to incite 
immediate lawless action. 102 
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware further reinforces the standards gleaned 
from both Watts and Brandenburg. lo3 Claiborne Hardware 
arose out of a seven year boycott of white merchants by the 
local chapter of the NAACP in Claiborne County, 
Mississippi. lo4 The economic boycott sought to force the 
merchants to comply with a list of demands issued by the 
NAACP seeking justice and racial equality for the Mrican 
97 Id. (emphasis added). 
98 Id. 
99 Watts, 394 U.S. at 705 (1969). 
100 See id. 
101 Id. See also Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 446·448 (1969). 
102 Id. 
103 See e.g., Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
104 Id. at 889·890. 
\ 
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Americans who patronized the downtown stores.1°5 The white 
merchants filed suit in Mississippi state court alleging that the 
boycott amounted to malicious interference with their business 
interests.106 The trial court agreed, awarding the merchants 
over one million dollars in damages based on the merchants 
loss of earnings and goodwill over the seven year boycott.107 In 
addition to awarding civil damages, the court issued a broad 
based injunction that banned the use of 'store watchers.'108 The 
injunction and sizable damages award effectively broke the 
boycott. 109 
The use of threatening speech was a major factor in the 
lower court's decision to award damages and grant the 
injunction. llo In bringing their suit, the merchants alleged that 
several Mrican American patrons in Claiborne County were 
threatened into participating in the boycott. ll1 As evidence of 
this contention the merchants pointed to several speeches 
made by Mr. Charles Evers, the Field Secretary of the NAACP 
in Mississippi. Mr. Evers was instrumental in organizing the 
boycott and made several speeches throughout its duration to 
the members of the First Baptist Church.112 During the April 
1, 1966 meeting at which the decision to boycott was reached, 
Evers warned the crowd that the Mrican Americans in the 
town would be watched, and anyone caught trading with the 
white merchants "would be answerable to him."113 Similarly, 
the merchants pointed to another speech given by Evers on 
April 19, 1969, in which he stated that all boycott-violators 
would be "disciplined" by their own people.114 Two days later, 
Evers admonished the crowd at First Baptist stating that "if we 
catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we're gonna 
break your damn necks."115 
The lower court noted that African Americans who violated 
105 Id. at 889. 
106 Id. at 889, 890. 
107 Id. at 893. 
108 Id. 
109 [d. 
110 [d at 894. 
111 [d. 
112 [d. at 898-903. 
113 [d. at 900. 
114 [d. at 902. 
115 Id. 
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the boycott were "disciplined" in a variety of ways. First, the 
boycott organizers placed "store-watchers" known as "Deacons" 
or "Black Hats" in front of the merchants' stores.116 The 
"Deacons" noted the names of those in the African American 
community who were actively violating the boycott. The 
violators' names were read aloud at weekly NAACP meetings, 
as well as reproduced in the local Black Times newspaper.ll7 
In addition to the seemingly innocuous threat of 
embarrassment in the community, boycott violators also faced 
the very real threat of physical violence. The trial court 
admitted evidence that indicated that the homes of two boycott 
violators were shot at, a brick was thrown through the 
windshield of one of the violator's cars, and a woman's flower 
garden was trampled by a youth who had witnessed her 
trading with white merchants.118 Another man testified that 
four men beat him when he failed to observe the boycott.1l9 
The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld Evers' and the 
NAACP's liability based on the lower court's common law tort 
theory. 120 The court held Evers jointly and severally liable for 
the civil damages and found that his speeches amounted to 
unprotected threats, and that these threats led to acts of 
violence in an effort to effectuate the boycott.121 In dismissing 
Evers' argument that his speech was protected by the First 
Amendment, the court stated that the "evidence shows the 
volition of many black persons was overcome out of sheer 
fear."122 Furthermore, the court opined that many boycotters 
were forced to participate in the boycott based on Evers' 
threats, and the use of violence and intimidation by supporters 
of the boycott.123 
A discussion of what constitutes unprotected speech was 
central to the U.S. Supreme Court's reversal of the lower 
court's decision. Although the Court again stopped short of 
articulating a 'true threat' test, the unanimous OpInIOn 
nonetheless adds to the standards set forth in Watts and 
116 Id. at 903·904. 
117 Id. at 904. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 905. 
120 Id. at 894. 
121 Id. at 895. 
122 Id. at 894. 
123 Id. at 894·895. 
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Brandenburg. The Court noted that although Evers' speeches 
certainly contained threats, and those threats were acted upon, 
his speeches were still within the protections of the First 
Amendment. 124 In commenting on the 'threat' of social 
ostracism and the use of social pressure as a means to enforce 
the boycott, the Court noted that, "speech does not lose its 
protected character simply because it may embarrass others or 
coerce them into action."125 Finally, the Court acknowledged 
that while Evers' statements may have been considered 
coercive and intimidating to non-participants, his speeches and 
conduct were still protected by the First Amendment.126 
The real marvel of the opinion is that the Court protected 
speech that expressly threatened an identifiable group of 
people that had every reason, both objectively and subjectively, 
to fear the truth of those threats based on a history of 
intimidation and violence practiced by the boycotters. In 
finding that Evers' speeches and threats were protected by the 
First Amendment, the Court noted that the emotionally 
charged speeches were made publicly for the purpose of uniting 
the African American community to realize their political and 
economic powers.127 The Court noted that even if Evers' 
express threats to "discipline" and to "break the damn necks" of 
boycott-breakers were construed as inviting unlawful activity, 
his speech was nonetheless protected under Brandenburg, 
because advocating the use of violence is a protected form of 
speech unless, taken in context, it tends to incite "imminent 
lawless action."128 Although there was evidence that acts of 
violence against non-participators followed one of Evers' 
speeches, his conduct did not transcend the protection of the 
First Amendment because the violence did not immediately 
follow the speech. 129 
Finally, in vacating the damages award, the Court 
commented on the difficulty of imposing monetary liability for 
conduct made up of constitutionally protected activity.130 The 
124 Id. at 907. 
125 Id. at 910. 
126 Id. at 911. 
127 Id. at 928. 
128 Id. (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448). 
129 Claiborne Hardware, 485 U.S. at 928. 
1M Id. at 918. 
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Court noted that in these circumstances, a "precision of 
regulation is demanded" that requires courts and juries to 
determine with specificity exactly what damages, if any, were 
proximately caused by the defendants' unprotected conduct, as 
only these damages are recoverable. 131 The Court recognized 
that while a variety of remedial measures are available to the 
states to deal with violence and threats of violence, "damages 
[must be] restricted to those directly and proximately caused by 
the wrongful conduct chargeable to the defendants."132 The 
court stated that it is of "prime importance that no 
constitutional freedom, least of all the guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights, be defeated by insubstantial findings of fact screening 
reality."133 Since the conduct of Evers and the NAACP was 
constitutionally protected, the Court found that none of the 
business losses incurred by the businessmen were proximately 
caused by the boycott. 134 Therefore, because the lower court's 
determination of liability was premised on unsubstantiated 
findings of causation it "screen [ed] reality," and could not 
stand.135 
Admittedly, no hard and fast test exists for defining just 
when one's speech or conduct will be deemed a 'true threat.' 
But, by combining the conclusions of Watts, Brandenburg and 
Claiborne Hardware a workable standard begins to emerge. 
Watts limits a 'true threat' to arising only in situations where 
the words were immediately threatening to the intended target 
of the threat. Moreover, Watts suggests that both the content 
of the threat, as well as the context in which it was made, must 
be taken into account in assessing the immediacy requirement 
of what constitutes a 'true threat.' Brandenburg stands for the 
principle that the mere advocacy of violence does not take 
speech outside the First Amendment, unless the advocacy, 
taken in context, tends to incite immediate lawless action. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 918 (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (noting that 
although, "[T]he careful limitations on damages liability imposed in Gibbs resulted 
from the need to accommodate state law with federal labor policy, [TJhat limitation is 
no less applicable, however, to the important First Amendment interests at issue in this 
case. '). Id. (emphasis added». 
133 See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 924 (citing Milk Wagon Drivers v. 
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941». 
134 See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 924. 
135 Id. 
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Similar reasoning is found in Claiborne Hardware. First, 
following Watts, the public context in which the speeches were 
made was important in finding that Evers' coercive speech and 
tactics were protected. Second, following Brandenburg, speech 
that advocated the use of violence was protected, even though 
violence ensued, because the violence didn't occur immediately 
after the speech, nor was it directly attributable to it. Third, 
recognizing our "profound national commitment" to "robust and 
wide-open debate" Watts, Brandenburg and Claiborne 
Hardware all emphasized the heightened First Amendment 
protections garnered by speech made in the political arena.136 
Finally, where monetary damages are based on speech or 
conduct that could be properly considered constitutionally 
protected activity, Claiborne Hardware dictates that courts 
must approach the problem with a "precision of regulation" to 
ensure that no constitutionally protected freedoms are 
impinged upon by insufficient findings.137 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE 'TRUE THREAT STANDARD TO THE 
FACTS OF PLANNED PARENTHOOD 
While the Constitution clearly protects most speech, it 
surely does not protect all speech. Individuals have a 
constitutional right to be safeguarded against both speech and 
actions that pose an immediate threat to life or limb.138 But at 
what point does a listener's fear that the speaker, or someone 
acting in concert, will harm him override the speaker's actual 
intent to harm? The question is more pointed if, as is the case 
here, the court does not even have an explicit threat from 
which to glean the speaker's intent. FACE seeks to punish the 
speaker's intent to convey a threat to use force to intimidate 
the listener.139 Should we require a showing of an actual intent 
to convey a threat, or is the context in which the message was 
delivered enough to infer that a threat was delivered? Should 
the standard be whether a reasonable listener would feel 
threatened by the remark, or whether it should have been 
136 See id. at 913. 
137 See id. at 916. 
136 See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 927·928; see also Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 
448. 
139 See 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(l). 
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reasonably foreseeable to the speaker that the remark would 
inspire fear in the listener? The Ninth Circuit was presented 
with these difficult questions in Planned Parenthood. 
Though the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of FACE 
requires a showing that the actor intended to threaten, the 
majority in Planned Parenthood seems to indicate that the 
context in which the defendant's implied threats were delivered 
is almost entirely dispositive.140 Without requiring that the 
defendants convey an explicit threat, or at a minimum, require 
a showing of intent to threaten, the majority allowed liability to 
be premised on the plaintiffs' fear, which was based, given the 
plaintiffs' testimony, on the context of violence that surrounded 
the un-related actions of third parties.141 But before silencing 
political discourse, the First Amendment requires more than a 
showing that the plaintiffs were subjectively afraid of the 
defendant's tactics-it reqUIres that they were 'truly 
threatened' by them.142 
The majority in Planned Parenthood is guilty of two 
colossal oversights. First, the majority failed to apply the 
standards announced in Watts, Brandenburg and Claiborne 
Hardware to the facts of Planned Parenthood, citing that those 
decisions "provided benchmarks, but no[t] definitions," as to 
what constitutes a 'true threat.'143 Most glaring in this respect 
is the court's refusal to acknowledge and apply the factual 
similarities between Claiborne Hardware and the instant case. 
In abandoning this precedent, the court relies on its own 
"reasonable speaker test" to define what is meant by a 'true 
threat.' The second oversight occurred when the court then 
curiously failed to apply the reasonable speaker test to the 
facts of the instant case. Instead, the court deceives the reader 
by relying on cases that employed the reasonable speaker test, 
yet bear little or no resemblance to the facts of Planned 
Parenthood. As will become clear, the likely reason for both 
140 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d. at 1078. The majority argued that "[iJndeed 
context is critical in true threats cases and history can give meaning to the medium" in 
which the treat was delivered. Id. (emphasis added). 
141 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1091 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
"Plaintiffs themselves explained that the fear they felt came, not from the defendants, 
but from being singled out for attention by abortion protesters across the country." Id. 
142 See Watts, 394 U.S. at 707. "What is a threat must be distinguished from what is 
constitutionally protected speech." Id. 
143 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1071. 
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these omissions is that the ACLA's actions could not be 
considered a 'true threat' even by the standard announced by 
the majority, nor could the majority uphold the decision while 
remaining faithful to the holdings of Watts, Brandenburg and 
Claiborne Hardware. 
A. DISMISSING WATTS, BRANDENBURG AND CLAIBORNE 
HARDWARE: FAILING To APPLY THE STANDARDS To THE 
FACTS OF PLANNED PARENTHOOD 
ACLA contends that liability was improperly based on 
political speech that constituted neither a 'true threat' nor 
incitement to imminent lawless action.l44 Since both the 
posters and the website contain no explicit threat, the ACLA 
argued that the case is really an incitement case in disguise. 145 
Given the lack of an express threat, the ACLA argues that the 
case should be analyzed against the holding of Claiborne 
Hardware, and that in light of that case, the decision should be 
reversed. As noted above, Claiborne Hardware stands for the 
principles that (1) the First Amendment protects intimidation 
and threats of social ostracism as well as offensive and coercive 
speech; (2) speech made publicly on highly charged political 
issues lies at the core of the First Amendment and courts must 
assess the imposition of liability with extreme care; and (3) civil 
liability for offensive and coercive speech cannot be imposed 
solely on account of a person's association with individuals who 
commit violence unless the individual incited or authorized the 
violence himself.146 
The similarities between Claiborne and Planned 
Parenthood are clear. First, both cases involved the efforts of 
groups engaged in the pursuit of a common political goal. 
Second, both groups used intimidating and coercive tactics to 
advance their political agendas; here the defendants attempted 
to coerce the plaintiffs into ceasing to provide abortions, and in 
Claiborne Hardware the effort was to force others to comply 
with the boycott.147 Third, in both cases the defendants 
144 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1070·1071. 
145 See id. 1072. 
146 See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 910, 926·928 (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 
at 448). 
147 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1095 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
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gathered publicly available information about their political 
adversaries and disseminated that information in an effort to 
coerce and intimidate the latter into action. Finally, similar to 
Claiborne Hardware, the defendants here face liability because 
their efforts to coerce others in furtherance of their political 
agenda were placed against the backdrop of the violent attacks 
made by unassociated third parties. 
The only apparent difference between the two cases is the 
outcome. In Claiborne Hardware, direct threats made as part 
of a political and social effort that were followed by violent acts 
of associated third parties were considered simply "emotionally 
charged rhetoric" that did not "transcend" the First 
Amendment.148 Here, public speech made on an issue of social, 
moral and political importance that merely intimidated the 
listener and was not followed by violence, was enough to 
support a crushing monetary judgment and an injunction that 
silenced, what the defendants believed was nothing more than 
political activism. 
The majority, however, rejects the idea that Claiborne 
Hardware is analogous, and points to several apparent 
dissimilarities between the cases. The majority's effort to 
distinguish Claiborne Hardware from the instant case does not 
withstand scrutiny and only serves to highlight the majority's 
unfamiliarity with the facts of either Claiborne Hardware, 
Planned Parenthood, or both. First, the majority attempts to 
distinguish Planned Parenthood by pointing to the fact that 
Claiborne Hardware was not decided under a threat statute, 
thus the Court did not need to consider whether Evers' 
statements were 'true threats.'149 This is only partially true. 
While Claiborne Hardware did not arise under a threat statute, 
respondents argued that liability was proper because Evers 
"threatened violence" to coerce participation in the boycott.150 
In addressing this allegation, the Court undertook to establish 
whether Evers' speeches were outside the First Amendment, 
either as 'true threats,' or incitement to imminent lawless 
activity. 151 Whether the case arose under a threats statute is 
not important when answering whether the First Amendment 
148 See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 928. 
149 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1073. 
150 See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 897. 
151 See id. at 927. 
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protects the speech. Clearly, as the majority in Planned 
Parenthood recognized, a 'true threat' for the purposes of FACE 
requires a "definition which comports with the First 
Amendment."152 It makes little impact on the present case that 
it was decided under FACE, since it is the First Amendment 
that defines the effectiveness of FACE. Similarly, it made little 
difference to the outcome of Claiborne Hardware that the case 
did not arise under a threat statute. In each, the question 
essentially is not whether the speech or conduct violated the 
statute, but whether it fell outside the protections of the First 
Amendment. Since the Court addressed whether Evers' 
speeches were threatening, the majority here errs in alluding 
to a dissimilarity because the present case was decided under a 
statute. 
Second, the majority attempts to distinguish Claiborne 
Hardware from the instant case by arguing that in Claiborne 
there was no context in which to place Evers' speeches, while 
the murders of doctors Gunn, Patterson and Britton provided 
context in which to analyze the threatening nature of the 
ACLA's speech Planned Parenthood. 153 This again is unfaithful 
to the facts of both Claiborne Hardware and Planned 
Parenthood. First, Evers' threats to "break the damn necks" of 
non-participators are directly threatening, thus context was not 
necessary in that instance to determine whether the speech 
was threatening, as the threat is apparent on the face of the 
statement. Second, in Claiborne Hardware there was ample 
context in which to assess whether Evers' speech was 
threatening. It was well noted in the trial record that non-
participators were subject to instances of physical violence and 
social ostracism.154 Thus, lack of context does not distinguish 
Claiborne Hardware from the instant case. 
The majority further attempts to distinguish Claiborne 
Hardware from Planned Parenthood by arguing that in the 
former, Evers did not threaten specific individuals, while here, 
the ACLA clearly singled out the Plaintiffs. While it is true 
that the ACLA specifically identified and targeted the 
Plaintiffs, this fact does not distinguish the case from 
152 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1071. 
153 See id. at 1073. 
154 Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 902-906. 
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Claiborne Hardware. It is clear from the facts of Claiborne 
Hardware that the names of specific individuals who broke the 
boycott were announced at weekly NAACP meetings as well as 
reprinted in the town's weekly Black Times newspaper.155 
Surely those who broke the boycott and were singled out at the 
meetings and in print felt threatened or intimidated, not by 
Evers or the NAACP, but by the fact that those participating in 
the boycott knew who they were. This is no different from the 
facts of Planned Parenthood. Here, the plaintiffs testified that 
their fear came not from being directly threatened by the 
defendants, but from being singled out for attention from right-
to-life groupS.156 Furthermore, given the small population of 
Claiborne County, Mississippi, and the zealous efforts of the 
"Deacons" to enforce the boycott by stationing themselves 
outside the storefronts, it is reasonable to infer that individuals 
who broke the boycott felt threatened by Evers' speeches. The 
fact that both cases involved apparent threats directed to 
specific targets highlights the factual similarities between the 
cases, not their dissimilarity. 
The majority also emphasizes that Claiborne Hardware 
provided no evidence that either Evers or the NAACP 
participated in, or authorized any violence against those who 
did not participate in the boycott.157 While it is certainly true 
that neither Evers nor the NAACP participated in violence, 
this fact does not distinguish Claiborne Hardware from 
Planned Parenthood. Here, like Claiborne Hardware, there is 
no evidence that the ACLA, or any of the named defendants 
ever authorized or participated in violent acts against the 
plaintiffs. Moreover, the record in Planned Parenthood notes 
only one instance where an individual participated in the 
making of a "wanted" poster and later resorted to violence, but 
that individual was not a defendant in the instant case.158 
155 See id. at 903·904. 
156 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1091. Dr. Newhall, one of the plaintiffs 
testified at trial that her fear "came from being identified as a target ... [and that] ... 
all the John Silva's [anti-abortionists] in the world know who I am, and that's my 
concern." Id. Similarly, Dr. Hern, also a plaintiff, testified that he was terrified when 
he found out he was on the list stating that, "its hard to describe that ... you are on a 
list of people who have been brought to public attention this way." Id. 
157 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1073-1074. 
158 See id. at 1091 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Paul Hill, a right-to-life activist, 
participated in the making of Dr. Britton's 'Wanted' poster and then shot him some 
seven months after the poster was released. Id. 
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Again, the majority fails to distinguish Claiborne Hardware 
from the facts of Planned Parenthood. 
Finally, the majority attempts to distinguish Claiborne 
Hardware by arguing that unlike Planned Parenthood, where 
the plaintiffs took seriously the perceived threats made by the 
defendants, no one took Evers' threats seriously, thus the 
Court was able to find that they were not 'true threats.'159 To 
support this contention, the majority opines that Mrican 
Americans must not have felt threatened since they continued 
to shop at the boycotted stores. 160 This logic cannot withstand 
scrutiny, and upon closer examination actually hurts the 
majority's cause. First, under the Ninth Circuit's own 
definition, a 'true threat' is based, not on the listener's fear, but 
on the speaker's belief that his words or actions will convey his 
intent to cause physical harm. 161 Thus, for the purposes of 
characterizing Evers' speech as a threat, it does not matter 
whether the threat was heeded, but only whether Evers knew 
his words would be interpreted by the listener as threatening. 
Surely Evers intended such a result. Second, since the 
majority asserts that threats are not 'true threats' unless they 
are heeded by the listener, then a fortiori the threats in the 
instant case must not be considered 'true threats' since the 
plaintiffs here continued to perform abortions after they became 
aware of the posters. 162 As the conduct of the threatened party 
is not dispositive as to whether a statement is a 'true threat,' it 
follows that Claiborne Hardware is indistinguishable from 
Planned Parenthood in this regard. 
As the dissent properly notes, the few dissimilarities that 
do exist between the two cases only highlight that the Planned 
Parenthood is far weaker factually to support liability for 
threatening speech.163 First, Claiborne Hardware involved 
explicit threats to specific targets that were followed by 
violence. 164 Here, the defendants made statements that lacked 
159 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1074. 
160 [d. (emphasis added). 
161 See id. (citing United States v. Orozco· Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 
1990». 
162 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1066. Dr. Crist did stop practicing 
medicine for some time after the release of the poster out of "fear for his life," but he 
did in fact return. [d. 
163 See id. at 1095 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
164 See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 928. 
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an express threat, and the statements were not followed by any 
acts of violence.165 Second, Claiborne Hardware involved 
statements that were threatening on their face. 166 In Planned 
Parenthood, given the lack of an express threat, the jury heard 
two weeks of testimony regarding recent violence against 
abortion providers-violence which was not committed by the 
defendants-in order to give the threats their proper context. 167 
In Claiborne Hardware, direct threats made on issues of a 
political nature, followed by violent acts of unassociated third 
parties were considered "political hyperbole" and protected by 
the First Amendment. Here, socially and politically expressive 
public speech that contained no express threat and was not 
followed by violence was enough to support a permanent 
injunction and a remarkable damages verdict. Though a far 
weaker case factually, the majority here chose to impute 
liability, while the Supreme Court refused to do so in Claiborne 
Hardware. 
In addition to rejecting Claiborne as factually analogous, 
the majority also turns away from one of its central holdings-
taken from Watts and Brandenburg-that speech made 
publicly on political or social issues requires heightened 
scrutiny before it can be stripped of its First Amendment 
Protections.168 Here, the alleged threats were communicated 
publicly. Both the posters and the website were unveiled at 
political rallies seeking to garner support for the defendant's 
political points of view.169 Undoubtedly, the posters and the 
165 See Planned Parenthood V. 290 F.3d at 1072. 
166 See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 902. During an April 21, 1969 speech Evers 
told listeners that if any Mrican American broke the boycott he would ''break your 
damn neck." Id. Similarly, in another speech Evers informed listeners that they would 
be "answerable to him" if they shopped at stores owned by the white merchants. Id at 
900. 
167 See Planned Parenthood V. 290 F.3d at 1078. 
168 See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (given our "profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open, and 
may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on 
government and public officials') Id. (citing New York Times Co. 376 U.S. at 270. See 
also Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 926·927 (where liability is based on "a public 
address-which predominantly contained highly charged political rhetoric lying at the 
core of the First Amendment-we approach the suggested basis for liability with 
extreme care"). Id. 
169 See Planned Parenthood V. 290 F.3d at 1064·1065. The Deadly Dozen Poster as 
well as the Nuremburg Files website were unveiled at a Washington, D.C., rally 
protesting Roe u. Wade. Similarly, the Crist Poster was unveiled on the footsteps of the 
St. Louis Courthouse that handed down the Dred Scott decision in an effort to draw a 
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website were devices used to convey the defendants' 
sociopolitical message. The majority however, declines to 
frame the defendants' statements as amenable to heightened 
protections stating that, threatening speech is proscribable 
"however communicated."170 Instead of analyzing whether the 
defendants' statements were entitled to heightened 
protection-as mandated by Watts and Brandenburg-the 
majority simply finds first that the statements were 'true 
threats,' then correctly states that threats are not entitled to 
First Amendment protection.l71 Here, the majority puts the 
cart before the horse. What they should have done is first 
address whether the statements could properly be considered 
threats in light of the political backdrop in which they were 
made, given the heightened protection such speech deserves, 
and then address whether within this context, the speech was 
threatening.l72 To decline to place the defendants' statements 
within this contextual framework is contrary to the holding of 
Watts, Brandenburg and Claiborne Hardware. 
Though factually and legally relevant, the majority chooses 
to ignore the importance of Claiborne Hardware. The reason is 
obvious. Were the court to acknowledge Claiborne Hardware it 
would have no choice but to reverse given the similarities 
between the two cases. Recognizing the importance of robust 
public debate, Watts, Brandenburg and Claiborne Hardware 
told us that speech publicly directed at issues of social and 
political importance should be analyzed with extreme care 
before liability is imposed and speech silenced. Planned 
Parenthood involves socially and politically important speech 
and thus should have invoked this heightened standard. Yet, 
the majority rejects this assertion.l73 Similarly, Claiborne 
Hardware holds that the First Amendment protects 
intimidating speech that aspires to coerce others to take a 
particular action. Planned Parenthood involved the efforts of a 
correlation between blacks being considered property, and unborn babies, according to 
the defendants, also being considered property under current law. [d. 
170 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1076 (citing Madson v. Women's Health 
Ctr. Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994». 
171 Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1076 .. 
172 See id. at 1088-1089 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
173 See id. at 1076. "Neither do we agree that threatening speech made in public is 
entitled to heightened constitutional protection just because it is communicated 
publicly rather than privately." [d. 
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political minority to coerce their political adversaries into 
taking certain actions in furtherance of their political agenda. 
Yet the majority claims that the two cases are not analogous.174 
Finally, relying on Brandenburg, Claiborne Hardware holds 
that liability for intimidating and coercive speech cannot be 
imposed on the basis of a persons association with individuals 
who commit violence, unless the individual himself authorized 
or incited the violence.175 The instant case involves statements 
that are not expressly threatening, yet could become so when 
viewed against the backdrop of violent acts committed by third 
parties who are unassociated with the defendants. Liability 
here was undoubtably premised on the actions of those third 
parties. 
The majority reasoned that Claiborne Hardware was not 
analogous and thus, not applicable. Instead, they articulated a 
"reasonable speaker test" and then failed to apply it. The 
reason they failed to apply it mirrors the reason they elected to 
dismiss Claiborne Hardware: namely that the application of its 
own test would, like an acknowledgment of Claiborne 
Hardware, require that the court reverse. 
B. OBFUSCATION: THE REASONABLE SPEAKER TEST AND THE 
MAJORITY'S FAILURE To APPLY IT. 
In place of the 'benchmarks' provided by the Supreme 
Court, the Ninth Circuit employed a "reasonable speaker test" 
to decide if the posters and the website were 'true threats' and 
thus outside the protections of the First Amendment.176 The 
test holds that whether a statement may be considered a 'true 
threat' is governed by whether a "reasonable person would 
foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to 
whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious 
expression of intent to harm or assault."177 The panel defined a 
threat as, "an expression of an intention to inflict evil, injury or 
damage upon another," and stated that alleged threats must be 
174 See id. at 1072. 
175 See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 926-928 (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 
448). 
176 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1074. 
177 See id. (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 
1262, 1625 (9th Cir. 1990». 
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weighed "in light of their entire factual context, including the 
surrounding events."178 Under this test, a 'true threat' exists 
where a reasonable person would foresee that the listener 
would believe he was about to be subjected to physical 
violence.179 
Mter articulating the standard from which the liability of 
the defendants will be judged, the court fails to apply it. 
Rather than assess whether the defendants conduct constituted 
a 'true threat,' the court uses a sleight of hand, citing other 
cases where a 'true threat' was found under the reasonable 
speaker test, but whose facts bear no resemblance to those of 
Planned Parenthood. Instead of analyzing whether liability 
was proper under the reasonable speaker test, the court tells us 
that context in which the alleged threat was communicated is 
critical. l80 Instead of pointing to evidence that the defendants' 
'threats' communicated a serious expression of intent to 
physically harm or intimidate the plaintiffs-as required by the 
reasonable speaker test and FACE-the court opines that the 
posters and websites were symbols that had acquired a 
"currency of death" in the wake of the previous murders.181 
These symbols, according to the majority, effectively put the 
defendants on notice that their conduct was likely to convey a 
threat. 182 By pointing to context, symbols and currencies, the 
majority is attempting to divert the reader's attention from 
their utter failure to provide evidence that the defendants 
expressed an intention to threaten the plaintiffs. In drawing 
the reader's attention away from this crucial fact, the court is 
able to find the defendants liable without any showing that 
their conduct failed the majority's own test. 
The majority cites several cases to support their contention 
that liability was proper in the instant case. Although the cases 
found that the defendant's speech or conduct amounted to a 
"true threat," none are factually or legally relevant to Planned 
Parenthood. In United States v. Dinwiddie, liability was 
178 See id. at 1075. 
179 See id. 
180 See id. at 1078. The majority noted that "indeed context is critical in a true 
threats case." Id. 
181 See id. at 1079. 
182 See id. at 1085. "The posters are a true threat because like Ryder trucks and 
burning crosses, they connote something that they do not literally say, yet both the 
actor and the recipient get the message." Id. 
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premised on the defendant making express threats directly to 
the intended target. 183 There, the defendant made several 
remarks outside an abortion clinic warning the plaintiff /doctor 
to, "remember Dr. Gunn ... This could happen to you ... Whoever 
sheds a man's blood, by man his blood shall be shed."184 She 
further stated, "[Y]ou have not yet seen violence until you see 
what we do to yoU."185 The Eight Circuit interpreted FACE's 
'force or threat of force' to proscribe Mrs. Dinwiddie's conduct 
and upheld an injunction ordering her to stop violating 
FACE.l86 
Similarly, the majority relies on United States u. Kelner. 
In Kelner, the defendant was convicted of transmitting an 
interstate threat in violation of a federal statute.l87 Kelner 
involved threats made against Yasser Arafat prior to a 1974 
visit to the United Nations in New York.l88 
During a television interview, the defendant-dressed in 
military fatigues and holding a handgun-stated that, "[WJe 
have people who have been trained and ... who intend to make 
sure that Arafat and his lieutenants do not leave this country 
alive."189 When pointedly asked by the reporter if he intended 
to kill Arafat, the defendant replied "We are planning to 
assassinate Mr. Arafat."190 Kelner argued that his statements 
were "political hyperbole" protected by the First Amendment.191 
The Second Circuit disagreed. In affirming the defendant's 
conviction the court looked to the explicitness, immediacy, 
specificity and context of the statements. 192 Given that the 
threats were explicit ("we are planning to assassinate"); 
immediate ("we have people who have been trained and are out 
now"); specific ("Arafat and his lieutenants") and the context 
(military clothing and the handgun), the court reasoned that 
183 United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996). 
184 Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 917. 
185 Id. (emphasis added). 
186 Id. at 929. 
187 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) criminalizes transmitting "in interstate commerce any 
communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the 
person of another." Id. 
188 See United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1021 (2d Cir. 1976). 
189 See Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1021 (emphasis added). 
190 Id. (emphasis added). 
191 Id. at 1022. 
192 Id. at 1028. 
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Kelner's statements were true threats and not protected by the 
First Amendment.193 
Dinwiddie and Kelner are so factually dissimilar to 
Planned Parenthood that their appearance as support for the 
majority's position is suspect. First, both Dinwiddie and 
Kelner involved express threats; the former, a direct threat to 
the intended target, while the latter communicated his threat 
to a specific target via the television. Moreover, in invoking the 
first person plural ("we are planning to assassinate" and ''You 
haven't seen violence until you see what we do to you") both 
parties expressed, not only intent to threaten, but also intent 
that they or someone acting in concert would harm or assault 
the victims.l94 As the dissent in Planned Parenthood properly 
notes, when a statement expressly threatens violence, the 
speaker expresses intent to harm the target, and then admits 
that he or she is among those that will help bring about that 
harm, it is hardly surprising that courts impose liability.195 
The above cases could be considered analogous to Planned 
Parenthood only if the defendants there had either: (1) directly 
confronted the plaintiffs and expressly threaten that they 
intended to harm the plaintiffs-as was the case in 
Dinwiddie---or, (2) created posters or a website in which the 
defendants expressly stated that it is their intent to 
assassinate or murder the plaintiffs, similar to Kelner. Of 
course, this was not the case. Here, the only evidence offered 
to illustrate the defendants' requisite intent to threaten were 
implied "statements," which were then placed against the 
backdrop of the violent acts of third parties. 
The majority also relies on United States u. Hart to 
illustrate that liability was proper in the instant case. At first 
blush, Hart appears somewhat analogous to Planned 
Parenthood. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that while Hart 
also involved an implied threat, the defendant there displayed 
the requisite intent to threaten or intimidate that is lacking in 
the instant case. On September 25, 1997, Hart, an anti-choice 
activist, parked two Ryder trucks outside the entrances of two 
193 [d. 
194 See id. at 1021. "We are planning to assassinate Mr. Arafat." [d. See also 
Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 917. "Patty, your have not seen violence yet until you see what 
we do to you." [d. 
195 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F. 3d at 1098 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); 
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Little Rock, Arkansas abortion clinics.196 He was indicted and 
later found to have violated the same 'force or threat of force' 
clause of FACE used to find the defendants liable in Planned 
Parenthood. 197 The Eighth Circuit disagreed with Hart's 
argument the trucks, standing alone, could not constitute a 
'true threat.'198 In addition to context and the likely 
connotations made about Ryder trucks in the wake of the 
Okalahoma City bombing, the court relied on evidence that 
Hart was a regular demonstrator at the two clinics and that he 
could provide no legitimate reason for parking the trucks other 
than to threaten the plaintiffs.199 Most importantly, testimony 
offered at trial by Hart's father indicated that Hart intended to 
threaten the plaintiffs. Hart evidently told his father that it 
would be worth it "if people believed there was a bomb in one or 
more of the trucks" if it helped to save the life of one baby.20o 
No doubt, the Hart court's finding that threats can be 
inferred from the medium provided the Planned Parenthood 
majority with basis for finding the defendants here liable for 
trafficking in threatening symbols and "currencies."201 Hart, 
however, is distinguishable in at least two important respects. 
First, as the dissent properly notes, the threat in Hart "did not 
come from the message itself, but from the potentially 
dangerous medium used to deliver it." Thus, the "symbols" (the 
trucks) themselves were threatening because it was possible 
that they were filled with explosives. Clearly, the perceived 
threat in the instant case did not come from the paper on which 
the posters were printed, but from the possibility that someone 
might harm the plaintiffs based on the information contained 
in the posters.202 Hart would be analogous only if the 
defendant there printed posters of Ryder trucks, or put images 
of Ryder trucks on an anti-choice website. Second, Hart was 
found liable because he intended to threaten the plaintiffs. 
Hart deliberately chose the Ryder truck because of the truck's 
196 See United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1069 (8th Cir. 2000). 
197 See Hart, 212 F.3d at 1070. 
198 ld. at 1072. 
199 ld. at 1072. 
200 ld. at 1070. 
201 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1085. "The posters are a true threat 
because like Ryder trucks and burning crosses, they connote something that they do 
not literally say, yet both the actor and the recipient get the message." ld. 
202 See supra note 156. 
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connection to violence after Oklahoma City; telling his father 
that it would help saves babies lives if the clinicians believed 
there were explosives on the truck. 203 Although the case 
involved an implied threat, the Hart court was correct in 
upholding liability because the medium used to express the 
threat was itself potentially dangerous, and the defendant 
expressly stated that it was his intent to threaten the 
plaintiffs. Neither of these elements was present in Planned 
Parenthood. 
The defendants in the cases relied upon by the majority 
displayed the intent to threaten required by both FACE and 
the reasonable speaker test.204 Yet the majority displays no 
evidence that the defendants in the instant case intended to 
threaten the plaintiffs. Without evidence of intent, the 
defendants' conduct could not be construed as a 'true threat' 
even under the standard announced by the majority. In the 
absence of intent, the defendants' 'threats' must be viewed, at 
best, as an incitement or call for others to harm the 
plaintiffs. 205 And while it undoubtedly makes little difference 
to the plaintiffs whether the harm will come from the 
defendants themselves or some unassociated third-party, it 
does make a difference with respects to the First 
Amendment.206 The Supreme Court has expressly stated that 
liability cannot be squared on the basis of violent acts 
committed by third parties unless the defendant incited those 
violent acts himself. 207 
It is precisely because they lack evidence of intent that the 
majority opinion traffics in "currenc[ies]" and symbols in order 
to find the defendants liable.20B As their only credible basis for 
liability, the majority states that doctors Gunn, Britton and 
Patterson were murdered after their posters were released and 
203 See Hart, 212 F.3d at 1070. 
204 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1076. The intent to threaten (i.e., the 
intent that the statement will be understood as a threat) is subsumed within the 
statutory standard of FACE which requires that the threat be made with the intent to 
intimidate. "The requirement of intent to intimidate serves to insulate the statute from 
unconstitutional application to protected speech." Id. (citing United States v. Gilbert, 
813 F.2d 1523, 1529 (9th Cir. 1989) and construing the Fair Housing Act's "threat" 
provision, which, is essentially the same as the one that appears in FACE). 
205 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1092 (Kozinski, J., dissenting.) 
206 See Id. 
207 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447·448. 
208 See Planned Parenthood V; 290 F.3d at 1079, 1085. 
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therefore the poster format had "acquired currency" as a death 
threat.209 "Knowing this," the majority continued "and 
knowing the fear [the posters] generated among those in the 
reproductive health services community ... the defendants 
deliberately identified [the plaintiffs] to intimidate them."210 
But a plaintiffs fear cannot form the sole basis for liability. 
Both FACE and the majority's own test require that the 
speaker intended to send the message that they intended to 
engage in physical violence.211 Moreover, as the Supreme 
Court made clear in Claiborne Hardware, tactics that merely 
intimidate or coerce the listener cannot form the basis for 
liability unless the speaker incites imminent lawless action.212 
For speech to be considered a true threat there must be 
evidence that the speaker himself intended to convey the 
message that he, or his accomplices, would immediately harm 
the target.213 Since the majority offers no evidence of the 
necessary intent, it follows that the defendants' conduct must 
not be considered a 'true threat.' 
The failure of the majority to find the necessary intent may 
not be its fault. Some commentators have suggested that the 
reasonable speaker test is almost unworkable in instances 
where the threat is implied, precisely because it is difficult to 
find the requisite intent.214 Whatever the shortcomings of the 
standard applied by the majority, it is clear that liability in the 
instant case was improper. There is no evidence to suggest 
that the defendants here intended to threaten that they, or 
someone acting in concert, would harm the plaintiffs. 
Furthermore, liability was improper as a matter of law because 
there is no evidence that the defendants conduct failed the 
reasonable speaker test. Moreover, reversal is required based 
209 See [d. at 1079. 
2\0 See [d. 
211 See [d. at 1091 (Kozinski, J., dissenting.) 
212 See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 910, 928 (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 
447,448). 
213 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-448. 
214 See Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J. L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 283, 346 (2001). "Some of the most difficult cases to analyze are those 
where the alleged threat is not explicit...the courts reliance on subjective factors often 
results in decisions that restrict speech that ought to be protected by the First 
Amendment." [d. Furthermore, without a showing of intent, "there is a danger that 
ambiguous statements not intended as threats will be interpreted as threats under the 
reasonable speakerllistener test." [d. at 316. 
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on the holdings of Claiborne Hardware and factual similarity 
between it and the instant case. As stated above, if the 
Supreme Court was unwilling to impute liability for 
intimidating and coercive speech where the speaker himself 
explicitly threatened violence and violent acts followed the 
speeches, it is absolutely non sequitor for the Ninth Circuit to 
premise liability on speech that was not expressly threatening 
and was not followed by violence. 
V. THE REMEDY 
The imposition of liability in Planned Parenthood was 
improper. So too was the remedy. The defendants here faced 
an unprecedented damages award for threatening speech. On 
the FACE claims, the jury awarded $405,834 to Planned 
Parenthood of the ColumbialWillamette ("PPCW"), $50,243 to 
Portland Feminist Women's Health Center ("PFWHC"), 
$39,656 to Dr. Crist, $15,797 to Dr. Elizabeth Newhall, $14,429 
to Dr. Hern, and $375 to Dr. James Newhall as to general 
compensatory damages.215 The Jury also awarded punitive 
damages on the FACE claims in the amounts of $29.5 million 
to PPCW, $23.5 million to PFWHC, $14.5 million to Dr. Crist, 
$14 million to Dr. Elizabeth Newhall, $13 million to Dr. Hern, 
and $14 million to Dr. James Newhall.216 On the civil RICO 
claims the jury awarded the plaintiffs (after trebling) over $12 
million dollars.217 All told, the jury found that the defendants 
in the instant case 'threatened' the plaintiffs to the tune of over 
$120 million dollars.218 
None of the cases cited by the majority Planned 
Parenthood that involved a FACE claim (cases premised on 
expressly threatening conduct by the defendants) awarded 
monetary judgments anywhere near the size of the one 
215 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1066. 
216 Id. at 1086. Although the majority vacated the punitive damages portion of the 
award and remanded to determine if it comported with due process, the award must be 
upheld unless it is considered "grossly disproportionate" Id. See In re Exxon Valdez, 
270 F.3d 1215, 1241 (9th Cir. 2001). 
217 Id. Although the RICO claims are outside the scope of this note, the damages 
awarded under them will be discussed here briefly. 
218 Actually, when the compensatory and punitive damage award of the FACE 
claims are added with the RICO damage awards the totaLis $120,868,893.00. Id. at 
1066. 
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awarded here. In fact, only one, Hart, even upheld the 
imposition of a monetary damage award, and that was merely 
a nominal "special assessment" fine in the amount of fifty 
dollars.219 The jury in Hart found the defendant guilty of 
violating FACE by using the Ryder trucks to threaten the 
clinicians, and the court sentenced the defendant to probation 
and community service in addition to the fine. 220 Similarly, the 
remedy in Dinwiddie was not a large compensatory and 
punitive damage award, but rather a narrowly tailored 
injunction.221 Dinwiddie too is instructive for the amount of 
care the court took in defining the parameters of the injunction. 
The court carefully outlined conduct that it would view as a 
violation FACE in the future, but also balanced Ms. 
Dinwiddie's interest in free expression.222 Thus the court held 
that while Ms. Dinwiddie could no longer engage in conduct 
that violated FACE in the future, she was still free to engage in 
forms of protest that didn't violate FACE, such as distributing 
literature, picketing and speaking outside of the clinic.223 The 
defendants in both Hart and Dinwiddie expressly threatened 
their intended targets, invoked fear in those targets and 
caused significant disruption in their daily lives, yet neither 
decision led to the financial ruin of the defendants, nor did it 
significantly chill free speech. 
Similarly, Claiborne Hardware is indicia of the Supreme 
Court's hesitancy to impose monetary damages for speech or 
conduct that is, or may be, constitutionally protected. There, 
the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that boycotters were 
coerced and threatened into participating in the boycott by 
Evers'speeches.224 The threats and coercion used to effectuate 
219 Note that both Hart and Dinwiddie were prosecutions by the U.S. government. 
While FACE directly limits the amount damages the government can recover in these 
actions (between $10,000 and $15,000 for first violation, and $15,000 to $25,000 for 
subsequent violations, the fact that the recovery is limited is irrelevant, what is 
relevant is the fact the defendants were not required to pay damages for the political 
speech that stepped from under the umbrella of the First Amendment. See 18 U.S.C. § 
(c)(2)(b)(i-ii). 
220 See Hart, 212 F.3d at 1070. Hart was sentenced to 4 years of probation, the first 
12 to be served in home detention, 200 hours of community service and the $50.00 fine. 
[d. 
221 See Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 929. 
222 See Planned Parenthood V. 290 F.3d at 1098. 
223 See Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 929. 
224 See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 890-891. 
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the boycott, held the court, amounted to malicious interference 
with the plaintiffs business.225 The court subsequently 
awarded the businessmen over one million dollars in damages 
and lost profits.226 The Supreme Court unanimously 
reversed.227 Finding first, that Evers' conduct was inside the 
umbrella of the First Amendment and second, that courts must 
proceed with caution when monetary liability is imposed for 
speech or conduct that may be constitutionally protected.228 In. 
reversing the damages award, the Court stated that when 
addressing whether speech or conduct is compensable "in the 
context of constitutionally protected activity ... [a] precision of 
regulation is demanded."229 This mandate, held the Court, 
requires that only damages proximately caused by the 
unlawful conduct may be recovered.230 Moreover, the Court in 
Claiborne Hardware noted that "while States have broad power 
to regulated activity, [they do not] have the right to prohibit 
peaceful political activity."231 The Court recognized that 
damages liability was a means by which the state could 
circuitously prohibit otherwise peaceful political activity, citing 
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, a case where the permissible scope of 
state remedies was "strictly confined" to the consequences of 
the unprotected conduct.232 Although the limitation on 
damages in Gibbs resulted from a need to balance federal labor 
policy with state tort remedies, the Court nevertheless held 
that the careful damage limitations were no less applicable to 
the First Amendment issues in Claiborne Hardware. 233 Thus 
the Court recognized the chilling effect that large damages 
awards can have on otherwise protected activity and took steps 
to guard against it. However, neither the "precision of 
regulation" directive, nor the requirement that courts carefully 
limit damages liability when First Amendment principles form 
the core of the case were followed in the Planned Parenthood. 
At a minimum, they should have been. 
225 See id. 
226 See id. at 893. 
227 See id. at 887. 
228 See id. at 916. 
229 See id. at 916 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963». 
230 See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 918. 
231 See id. at 913. 
232 See id. at 916-918. 
233 See id. at 918. 
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Similarly, the fact that over twelve million dollars of the 
overall damages award was based on civil RICO should make 
little difference. Since Claiborne Hardware mandates that only 
those damages proximately caused by the unprotected conduct 
may be recovered when First Amendment principles form the 
core of the case, plaintiffs should not be allowed to recover 
circuitously, (via civil RICO statutes) that which they could not 
recover for directly. Although the Supreme Court has 
previously declined to apply the dictates of Claiborne 
Hardware to cases imposing RICO liability for the actions of 
anti-choice groups, the size of the RICO award here 
distinguishes Planned Parenthood from the earlier cases.234 
The evisceration of the First Amendment, as well as the 
chilling effect of a substantial damages award is foreboding to 
the would-be political activist in any form. Likely exposure to 
damages awards and the mere threat of lawsuits will chill 
speech regardless of the theory of liability chosen by the 
plaintiff. 
Limiting recovery to only those damages proximately 
caused when political activists step outside the umbrella of the 
First Amendment is sound policy. The Supreme Court long 
ago recognized that the threat of financial ruin can have a 
seriously chilling effect on all manner of free speech.235 It 
follows that injunctions are the proper remedy in cases where 
political activism crossed the line into unprotected speech. 
Injunctions have a de minimus effect on political dissidents, as 
those enjoined from participating in unlawful activity are still 
. free to participate in lawful forms of activism. Moreover, 
injunctions are superior to monetary damages because at least 
they carefully define that which is prohibited.236 A damages 
234 In Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 886 F.2d 1342 (3d. Cir. 1989) 
anti·abortion protesters blocked access to the clinic, as well as trespassed in the clinic 
in at least four documented instances. The 3,d Circuit held that the protester's nine-
year effort to disrupt the clinic's activities deprived the center of the use of a legal 
property interest, violating the Hobbs ActJRICO. However, the total award-including 
damages (after trebling), cost of repairing broken property, as well as attorneys fess 
and costs amounted to only $64,946.11. See Brian J. Murray: Note: Protestors, 
Extortion, and Coercion: Preventing RICO from Chilling First Amendment Freedoms, 
75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 724-28. In contrast, the RICO award here was over 12 
million dollars. See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1066. 
236 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1100 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing 
New York Times Co., 383 U.S. at 277-279). 
236 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1100. 
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award, on the other hand, leaves future speakers at the mercy 
of local juries, who decide after the fact that the speech or 
conduct stepped outside the umbrella of the First 
Amendment.237 
The cases relied upon by the majority in Planned 
Parenthood recognized injunctions and less restrictive 
alternatives as the proper tools to balance a plaintiffs' 
legitimate interest in safety with the defendants' constitutional 
right to protest. In this sense, Dinwiddie is instructive not 
only for the amount of care the court took in defining 
parameters of the injunction, but because the court declined to 
attach a monetary award to the judgment.238 Similarly, in 
Hart, the defendant was not enjoined from any conduct, but 
merely faced probation, community service and a nominal 
fine. 239 Because of the limited nature of the sentences imposed 
by the courts, both Dinwiddie and Hart were still free to 
engage in protest; they just were not allowed to do so in 
violation of FACE. And while the defendants here are still free 
to engage in political protest, it better be of an inexpensive 
varietal, as they face enormous debt that is not dischargeable 
in bankruptcy and have little chance of ever regaining financial 
independence.24o Further, and perhaps more importantly, the 
sheer size of the judgment will undoubtedly cause other 
protesters to take notice and circumscribe their conduct 
accordingly. To some, the verdict's restriction on the conduct of 
anti-choice groups seems appropriate and perhaps long 
overdue. But those who agree with the outcome must recognize 
that while today it is anti-choice groups that bear the enormous 
costs of failing to act within the First Amendment, tomorrow it 
may be a less repugnant group. The First Amendment 
"attempt[s] to secure the widest possible dissemination of 
information from diverse and antagonistic sources," when its 
237 Id. 
238 See Dindwiddie, 76 F.3d at 928·929. See also supra note 219. 
239 See Hart, 212 F.3d at 1070. Hart was sentenced to four years probation, the flrst 
twelve months to be served in home detention, 200 hours of community service and a 
special assessment of $50.00. Id. 
240 See In re Treshman, 258 B.R. 613, 622 (D. Maryland 2001). Donald Treshman 
was the regional director of the ACLA and a defendant in Planned Parenthood. He 
flIed for bankruptcy on November 2, 1999, shortly after the initial verdict. The court 
held that all judgments entered against him arising out of the case were 
nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Id. 
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protections are limited, when there is silence on the issues of 
our time-even though that silence may well be a welcomed 
reprieve--we alllose.241 
Mter Planned Parenthood, faced with the likelihood of 
substantial monetary judgments, speakers engaged in all forms 
of political activism will surely hesitate, "lest they find 
themselves at the mercy of a local jury."242 No doubt the lesson 
of what the local jury did to the defendants in Planned 
Parenthood will not be lost on those who engage in political 
protest. Injunctions, or damage awards limited to only those 
damages "proximately caused" by the unprotected conduct are 
the proper remedies in cases that involve political speech that 
falls outside the protections of the First Amendment. 
Injunctions have a de minimus effect on speech. So too does 
the proximate cause limitation advanced in Claiborne 
Hardware, as a defendant is only liable for that which he 
should have, at the least, expected to be liable for. The 
defendants here could not have expected what a local jury did 
to them, and the "robust and wide open debates" guaranteed by 
the first amendment will surely suffer for it. 
CONCLUSION 
Speech "may indeed best serve its high and noble purpose 
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction 
with conditions as they are, or even stir people to anger. 
Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at 
prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling 
effects as it presses for the acceptance of an idea." 243 
In her inspired dissent, Judge Berzon noted that Planned 
Parenthood is proof positive that "hard cases make bad law, 
and ... when a case is very hard ... there is a distinct danger 
of making very bad law."244 The learned judge is right on both 
accounts-Planned Parenthood was a very difficult case, and 
241 New York Times Co., 383 U.S. at 271. 
242 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1100 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing 
New York Times Co., 383 U.S. at 277-279). 
243 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). 
244 Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1101 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (emphasis in 
original). 
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the outcome resulted in very bad law. The case was difficult 
because, like the majority, at least on some level, we want to 
find the defendants liable. Indeed even the staunchest 
defenders of the First Amendment failed to show up on the 
defendants behalf, with only the state chapter, but neither the 
national nor local chapter, of the ACLU filing an amicus curie 
brief on the defendants' behalf.245 The absence of "friends" is 
hardly surprising. The defendants' tactics were nothing short 
of offensive, and certainly tasteless when viewed in the context 
of murders of doctors Gunn, Patterson and Britton. But being 
offensive is not a crime, neither is political activism, unless it 
incites imminent lawless action or 'truly' threatens the listener. 
Poor taste, coupled with the violent acts of unassociated third 
parties, however much it may bother us, is not enough to 
impose liability for threatening speech. 
This is precisely why Planned Parenthood resulted in very 
bad law. The jury here heard day-after-day of testimony 
regarding the violent deaths of the doctors and the violent acts 
of others.246 Yet the defendants here committed no acts of 
violence. Similarly, after combing the record and analyzing the 
violent and threatening acts of others, the majority here speaks 
not of intent and true threats, but of "symbols" and 
"currencies."247 In doing so, the majority dismissed the 
standards articulated in Watts and Brandenburg and failed to 
acknowledge the clear similarities between Claiborne 
Hardware and the instant case. Planned Parenthood is bad 
law because it stands for the principle that implied threats 
with no showing of intent to harm can serve as the basis for 
liability. It is bad law because in allowing the jury verdict to 
stand, the court sent a powerful message to political activists in 
the unfortunate position of advocating messages that are 
acceptable to the majority. The message is simple: speak 
quietly, and on subjects that we all agree on, or it will cost you. 
Mter Planned Parenthood, that message is certainly expensive 
enough to make those political activists who advocate 
245 Id. at 1061. See also Steven G Gey, Article: The Nuremberg Files and the First 
Amendment Value of Threats, 78 TEX. L. REV. 541, 542-544 (2000). Mr. Gey correctly 
chides civil libertarians for not coming to the defense of the defendants First 
Amendment claims during the first trial. See id. 
246 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1078. 
247 See Planned Parenthood V, 290 F.3d at 1085. 
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unpopular positions take notice. Simply stated, Planned 
Parenthood is bad law because it eviscerates the protections of 
the First Amendment and in a very powerful way chills free 
speech. 
Mter Planned Parenthood and its crushing damages 
award, freedom of speech is not only figuratively less "free," but 
also literally. Unpopular speech now carries a potentially 
ruinous financial burden. In dismissing Claiborne Hardware 
and finding the defendants' conduct outside the umbrella of the 
First Amendment, the majority put a heavy price tag upon 
what was once considered protected political discourse. The 
question now becomes--can we afford to pay? 
Randall D. Nicholson" 
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